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Summary 
We investigate the relationships between water quality and socioeconomic factors in 
California at the county level for the years 1993 to 2006 using 24 water quality indicators 
coming from seven different types of water bodies. We estimate these relationships using 
three classes of models: the traditional per capita income-pollution level - Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) - specifications, a more inclusive model containing main 
socioeconomic variables such as agricultural intensity, land use, ethnic composition, 
population density and educational attainment, and a model that includes the 
socioeconomic variables while accounting for spatial correlations too. For most water 
quality indicators, we do not find support for EKC specifications. For pollutants like 
phosphorus and total suspended solids, the level of agricultural activity is a significant 
determinant of water quality in California, but for other surface water pollutants commonly 
considered agricultural pollutants, such as ammonia and nitrate, the level of agricultural 
activity is not statistically significant. We find that education, ethnic composition, age 
structure, land use, population density, and water area are all significantly correlated with 
various indicators of water quality. 
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Abstract 
We investigate the relationships between water quality and socioeconomic factors in California 
at the county level for the years 1993 to 2006 using 24 water quality indicators coming from 
seven different types of water bodies.  We estimate these relationships using three classes of 
models: the traditional per capita income-pollution level -Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)- 
specifications, a more inclusive model containing main socioeconomic variables such as 
agricultural intensity, land use, ethnic composition, population density and educational 
attainment, and a model that includes the socioeconomic variables while accounting for spatial 
correlations too. For most water quality indicators, we do not find support for EKC 
specifications. For pollutants like phosphorus and total suspended solids, the level of agricultural 
activity is a significant determinant of water quality in California, but for other surface water 
pollutants commonly considered agricultural pollutants, such as ammonia and nitrate, the level of 
agricultural activity is not statistically significant. We find that education, ethnic composition, 
age structure, land use, population density, and water area are all significantly correlated with 
various indicators of water quality. 
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Socioeconomic Factors and Water Quality in California  
1. Introduction 
As in many parts of the world, clean water is a vital, but threatened, resource in 
California.  The results of a U.S. EPA assessment of water quality in California in 2004 found 
that: (1) about 93% of the state’s water is “impaired,” a term that means the body of water cannot 
be used for at least one of its designated uses (these uses may include recreation, commercial 
fishing, agricultural water supply, drinking water supply, and wildlife habitat, among others), (2) 
about 5% of assessed water bodies are “threatened,” indicating that there is a high probability 
that their designated uses will no longer be viable in the future, and (3) only about 3% of the 
water bodies assessed in the state are labeled good enough to be used for all of their designated 
uses with none of these uses threatened (U.S. EPA, 2004).  Table 1 in the Appendix outlines 
common sources of a variety of water pollutants.  Many different causes underlie these 
impairments, including factors related to agriculture, industry, households, and natural processes.  
The objective of this paper is to test hypotheses (discussed in detail in section 2) regarding the 
per capita income-pollution level (EKC) and several key socio-demographic-geographic factors 
affecting the quality of surface water in California.  To test these hypotheses, we estimate 
statistical relationships between potential factors affecting water pollution and water quality 
indicators at the county level. 
To date, little work has been done to identify the key factors affecting California water 
quality.  Charbonneau and Kondolf (1993) argued that development in California tends to occur 
on prime agricultural land, pushing agricultural production onto more marginal lands and 
increasing the pollution resulting from agriculture.  However, they did not have data to test their 
hypothesis.  Byron and Goldman (1989) examined land use and water quality in the Lake Tahoe 
region.  They considered. They found significant, positive relationships between nitrogen, total 
phosphorus, and suspended solids and the percentage of highly erodible land disturbed or 
covered by human activity.  Their study, however, could not determine which human activities 











effects of urban river discharge on bacteria levels in ocean water on southern California beaches 
and found that this discharge and precipitation levels are strongly associated with bacteria levels. 
A plethora of studies have tested the existence of the environmental Kuznets curve.  The 
EKC theory posits that as income initially increases, environmental quality declines, but after a 
certain per capita income level, quality begins to and continues to improve as income increases.  
This relationship may occur because water quality is a normal good and as income increases, 
people demand more water quality (Grossman and Kruger, 1995).  It may also occur because as 
areas get wealthier, they can invest in more pollution control technology (Nahman and Antrobus, 
2005).  Similarly, as income increases, the composition of aggregate production tends to shift 
from polluting industries like agriculture and industry to less polluting services, while importing 
goods whose polluting production processes take place elsewhere (Grossman and Kruger, 1995; 
Aldy, 2005).  Furthermore, technological advances in production and pollution abatement, 
tightening of quality standards, and improvements in monitoring and enforcement of standards 
over time can all result in better water quality.  While the macro level factors driving the 
environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis will not hold at the state-level, it is possible that even 
within the state of California, wealthier communities demand better water quality and have more 
resources to implement pollution abatement.   
Four studies test for the environmental Kuznets curve for water quality or use within one 
state.  Franczyk and Chang (2009) use OLS and spatial regression models to estimate the effects 
of income, precipitation, temperature, urban development, and farm and family size on water use 
at the county level in Oregon.  They find a negative relationship between income and water use, 
but the effects of temperature and precipitation are larger in magnitude.  They also conclude that 
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimates are biased due to spatial correlation across counties.  
Paudel et al. (2005) and Paudel and Schafer (2009) test the effects of income and social capital, 
respectively, on water quality in parishes in Louisiana.  Paudel et al. account for spatial effects 
by including the average level of income in surrounding parishes and find evidence of an 











dissolved oxygen.  Paudel and Schafer employ a spatial autoregressive model containing an 
index of social capital and control for population density.  They find a U-shaped relationship 
between nitrogen concentrations and the social capital index but find no relationship between 
concentrations of phosphorus or levels of dissolved oxygen and social capital.  Gergel et al. 
(2004) use sediment records from Lake Mendota in Dane County Wisconsin to estimate 
historical levels (1900 – 2000) of phosphorus, cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, and sulfur and 
regress these levels on linear, quadratic, and cubic specifications of real wealth per capita.  Only 
chromium exhibits a robust EKC relationship.  
Our study is the first to consider water quality across the entire state of California and to 
examine a wider range of socioeconomic factors than those considered in previous studies.  It 
includes water quality and socioeconomic data at the county level for the years 1993 to 2006.  
The water quality data cover 24 water quality indicators coming from seven different types of 
water bodies such as rivers, lakes, and estuaries.  We estimate the relationship between these 
water quality indicators and the socioeconomic variables using three classes of models: the 
traditional EKC specifications, a more inclusive model containing a variety of socioeconomic 
variables, and a model that includes the socioeconomic variables while accounting for spatial 
correlation.   
Our study goes beyond examining the effects of purely economic factors such as income 
and sectoral economic activities. It also investigates important questions such as: Is California 
agriculture the main culprit of the state’s water pollution?  Do California ethnic minorities (non-
Caucasians) suffer from lower water quality than the white population?  Do California counties 
with a better educated population enjoy better water quality?  How are socio-demographic 
factors, such as population age and gender, and geographic considerations, such as water body 
types and adjacent county economic activity, correlated with indicators of water quality?  Some 
of our empirical findings run counter to common intuition. For example, with the exception of 
ammonia, copper, and fecal coliform, we do not find support for the EKC relationship between 











the common presumption that agricultural activity is the principal culprit of some water 
pollutants normally associated with agriculture, such as nitrates, sulfates, ammonia, and copper. 
Perhaps surprisingly, we also find that for water quality indicators, such as cadmium and copper, 
some ethnic minorities, such as Native Americans and African Americans, experience better 
water quality than Caucasians do. Further, we do not find empirical support for the view that a 
population with a higher share of females enjoys better water quality than one with a higher male 
share.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents our water quality 
hypotheses to be tested and the data with which we test these hypotheses.  Section 3 presents the 
three sets of empirical estimation models.  In section 4, we present and discuss the estimation 
results. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.  
 
2.1  Hypotheses 
This paper tests three sets of hypotheses.  First, we test the environmental Kuznets curve 
hypothesis so see whether a relationship exists between income and water quality at the county 
level in California.  Since previous studies of the environmental Kuznets curve find turning 
points, if they exist, at per capita income levels below the per capita income levels of California 
counties, we may not find statistically significant relationships.  However, if the Kuznets curve 
is, indeed, U-shaped and not a higher order polynomial, we should still find a positive 
relationship between income and water quality within our relatively wealthy sample. 
  The second set of hypotheses focus on the following socioeconomic and physical 
variables that may influence water quality:   
  Agriculture:  We suspect that those areas with higher intensity of agricultural production will 
have higher levels of agricultural pollutants.  
  Education:  Communities with high education levels and a higher valuation of education may 
be environmentally better informed and better understand the implications of water pollution, 











than those counties with lower educational attainment.  This would be consistent with the 
findings of Farzin and Bond (2006).   
  Ethnic composition:  Several reasons exist why we might find negative relationships between 
minority ethnic groups and water quality.  First, some ethnic groups may value the 
environment less than others, and consequently, demand less water quality improvement 
from their governments.  Second, some ethnic groups with low per capita income may have a 
stronger preference for meeting basic needs than for improving water quality.  Similarly, 
these ethnic groups may be more prominently employed by polluting industries, and 
consequently must also reside in these areas.  Lastly, racism may play a roll in the placement 
of polluting industries or toxic wastes in areas predominantly occupied by minorities (Brulle 
and Pellow, 2006).   
  Gender composition:  Some work (e.g. Konisky et al., 2008; Fukukawa et al., 2007) suggests 
that women tend to care more about the environment than men, so we might find a negative 
correlation between the percent of a county that is male and water quality.   
  Water acreage:  If there are economies of scale in water pollution control (that is, the average 
cost of pollution control decreases with the quantity of water controlled for pollution) then 
counties with a large quantity of water may have better water quality.  Conversely, if 
pollution control gets increasingly difficult and hence more expensive as water acreage 
increases, counties with a large quantity of water may have poorer water quality than those 
counties with smaller water acreage. 
  Types of water bodies:  Pollutants likely accumulate or, conversely, flush out of different 
types of water bodies differently.  Ideally, we would allow for separate relationships between 
water quality and the socioeconomic variables for each type of body of water.  However, too 
few variables exist for some pollutants and body of water types to perform this kind of 
analysis, so we include dummy variables instead. 
  Spatial correlation: Lastly, we hypothesize that spatial correlation of water quality and 











California do not follow county boundaries, so agricultural runoff containing nitrates or 
phosphates will likely make its way across county boundaries. Additionally, rivers directly 
connect the water quality of neighboring counties, and the water quality of upstream counties 
will directly affect the water quality of downstream counties.    
2.2. Water Quality Data 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for water quality indicators.  The water quality 
data for the study come from the EPA’s Storage and Retrieval (STORET) database.  This 
database collects water quality data from a wide variety of state and federal sources such as the 
California Department of Water Resources, the EPA National Aquatic Resource Survey, the 
California Surface Water Monitoring Program, the California State Water Resources Control 
Board, and the National Park Service.  Due to the heterogeneity of sources, the sampling 
procedures may differ, increasing the random noise in the dataset.  The data also do not represent 
a completely random sample, as one would hope to have.  Sources may sample for a variety of 
reasons including monitoring potentially hazardous sites, monitoring already hazardous sites, or 
simply keeping an eye on water quality.  As a result, poor quality sites may be overrepresented in 





Table 2:  Summary Statistics for Water Quality Indicators 
Pollutant Units  Observations  Median Standard  Deviation 
Ammonia   ug/l  95  0.00  0.08 
Arsenic   ug/l  68  1.54  9.38 
Cadmium   ug/l  81  0.0005  4.27 
Chromium ug/l  68  0.18  18.49 
Copper   ug/l  96  2.02  42608.04 











Fecal Coliform   cfu/100ml  56  10  719.80 
Iron   ug/l  51  110  4886.97 
Lead ug/l  67  0  3.77 
Magnesium   ug/l  55  3500  188152.20 
Manganese   ug/l  65  22.23  201.50 
Mercury   ug/l  56  0.48  7.09 
Nickel   ug/l  58  1.91  21.05 
Nitrate ug/l  117  0.06  1.86 
Nitrite   ug/l  68  0  2.43 
pH     254  7.87  1.55 
Phosphorus   mg/l  69  0.00  0.23 
Selenium   ug/l  128  1  70.69 
Specific Conductivity   S/cm  444  208  11883.52 
Sulfate   mg/l  103  5  16028.32 
Total Coliform   cfu/100ml  38  63.50  6083.08 
Total Suspended Solids   mg/l  148  2.77  13420.28 
Zinc   ug/l  53  2.29  222925.4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on: Environmental Protection Agency.  STORET Data Warehouse.  Available 
<http://www.epa.gov/storet/dw_home.html>. 
 
Water quality levels that were recorded as “non-detect” and “present<QL,” where “QL” 
means “quantifiable limit,” in the STORET database were entered as zeros in our dataset, which 
may underestimate the amount of water pollution.  Samples for which the water quality level was 
entered as “present>QL” in the STORET database were dropped since this classification 
provides no useful information.  Only a small number fell into this final category. Each sample in 
the STORET database represents one water sample that was taken from a specific location.   
Since most of the socioeconomic data is available at the county level, all samples were 
aggregated up to the county level by water body type and pollutant.  For example, if county x 
had fifteen samples of nitrate levels in rivers, the median of these 15 samples was calculated.  
Similarly, if county y had 32 samples of fecal coliform levels in lakes, the median of these 32 











samples in this manner. 
 
2.3.  Explanatory Variables  
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the independent variables including per capita 
income (Income), population density (Population Density), measures of agricultural intensity 
(Value of Crop, Value of Animal), level of education (Education), water area (Water Acres), 
water sampling intensity (Moderately Low, Moderately High, and High Monitoring), county 
composition with regards to ethnicity (Percent Black, Percent Asian or PI, Percent Native 
American, Percent Hispanic, and Percent Other), gender (Percent Males), age (Percent 0 to 4, 
Percent 5 to 17,  Percent 18 to 40,  Percent 65 or Older), and water sample sites (Rivers, 







Table 3: Summary Statistics for Socioeconomic Variables 
Variable  Observations Mean  Standard  Deviation  Min  Max 
Per Capita Income  2471 34768.270  12429.270  18750.720  79187.940 
Population Density  2471 2.127  5.798  0.003  26.534 
Value of Crop Production per Acre of County Land Area  2471 194.278  279.518  0.000  1574.796 
Value of Neighboring Crop Production per Acre of County Land Area:         
     1 Year Lag  2471 286.453  261.437  0.167  1068.019 
     2 Year Lag  2471 289.848  268.119  7.705  1055.36 
     3 Year Lag  2471 288.153  266.181  7.705  1127.339 
Value of Animal Production per Acre of County Land Area  2471 53.811  93.081  0.000  1051.536 
Value of Neighboring Animal Production per Acre of County Land Area:       
     1 Year Lag  2471 71.210  82.205  4.384  472.420 
     2 Year Lag  2471 75.035  86.310  4.712  490.900 
     3 Year Lag  2471 73.170  83.146  4.712  459.931 
Percent Eligible for UC or CSU Schools  2471 32.814  10.401  0.000  65.300 
Percent of County Area Covered by Water  2471 0.137  0.202  0.002  0.799 
Number of Samples per Acre of County Water  2471 0.005  0.082  0.000  3.814 











Percent of the Population in Each County that is:        
     White  2471 0.643  0.181  0.192  0.938 
     Black  2471 0.041  0.038  0.002  0.168 
     Asian or Pacific Islander  2471 0.074  0.082  0.003  0.324 
     Native American  2471 0.022  0.032  0.002  0.170 
     Hispanic  2471 0.202  0.143  0.021  0.748 
     Other  2471 0.019  0.009  0.003  0.044 
     Male  2471 0.506  0.018  0.487  0.647 
     0-4 years old  2471 0.068  0.015  0.002  0.109 
     5-17 years old  2471 0.188  0.034  0.004  0.257 
     18-40 years old  2471 0.329  0.049  0.007  0.443 
     41-64 years old  2471 0.298  0.049  0.005  0.404 
     65 or more years old  2471 0.123  0.028  0.002  0.215 
Percent of Samples in Each County from:        
     Rivers  2471 0.668  0.471  0.000  1.000 
     Estuaries  2471 0.103  0.304  0.000  1.000 
     Lakes  2471 0.080  0.272  0.000  1.000 
     Oceans  2471 0.020  0.139  0.000  1.000 
     Canals  2471 0.001  0.035  0.000  1.000 
     Reservoirs  2471 0.049  0.216  0.000  1.000 
     Springs  2471 0.052  0.222  0.000  1.000 
     Drinking  2471 0.009  0.096  0.000  1.000 
     Runoff  2471 0.014  0.118  0.000  1.000 




Agricultural production data come from the National Agricultural Statistics Service’s 
County Agricultural Commissioners’ Data, an annual report that contains the value of production 
by crop or animal product.  The values of crop and livestock production at the county level were 
obtained from these reports.  To measure the intensity of production, these values were divided 
by the total land area of each county.   
The education data come from the California Department of Education’s county reports.  
The measure of educational attainment used is the percent of graduating high school seniors who 
meet the eligibility criteria needed to attend a University of California (UC) or a California State 











seniors as well as the quality of education and support provided to students.   
The measure of water and land acreage in each county was obtained from data from the 
Department of Water Resources, Division of Planning and Local Assistance.  Per capita income 
was obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis.  This 
measure includes wages and salaries, supplements to wages and salaries, proprietor’s income 
adjusted for inventory valuation and capital consumption, rental income, personal income 
receipts on assets, and transfers.  It does not include government social insurance contributions.   
The estimates of total population, the number of immigrants entering a county, the 
number of individuals at each age level, the number of individuals in main racial categories, and 
the number of males and females at the county level were obtained from the California 
Department of Finance’s Demographic Research Unit.  The immigration data were converted 
into a measure of the number of immigrants entering a county in a given year as a percent of the 
county’s total population.  The age data were converted into the percentage of individuals in 
various age groupings in each county.  The racial and gender data were also converted into 
percentage terms.   
Finally, we include controls for the type of body of water from which a given sample was 
taken.  Samples were taken from rivers, lakes, estuaries, coastal ocean areas, reservoirs, springs, 
canals, drinking water sources, runoff, and wetlands.     
 
3.  Empirical Models 
In studying the determinants of water quality in California, we consider factors both on 
the demand and supply sides.  On the demand side, we focus on such socioeconomic variables as 
per capita income, ethnicity, education, gender, and age.  We assume the quality of political 
institutions (degree of democracy) through which preferences for water quality are expressed to 
be the same across all counties in California.
1  Some demand side variables such as income, 
education, or ethnicity, appear to be endogenous; rich people with a strong preference for water 
quality may move to areas with higher water quality while poor people tend to trade   
                                                 
1 For a study of the effect of the openness and democratic degree of political regimes on environmental quality at the 











environmental quality for income by residing in more polluted but less expensive areas. This 
argument is, however, likely true within counties.  People may prefer to live in one town than 
another because of physical characteristics like water quality.  At the county level, the presence 
of employment opportunities, family members or friends are much more likely to determine 
where people live than the county’s water quality.  On the other hand, rich people may positively 
influence water quality of their locale by being politically more influential, relative to poor 
people, to raise the water quality standards and the public budget allocations to pollution control 
efforts and monitoring and enforcement of the standards.  
  On the supply side, we focus both on the anthropogenic variables such as the type and 
intensity of economic activities (specifically the intensities of crop and livestock activities) and 
on the spatial and natural sources of water pollutants such as the types of water bodies (oceans, 
rivers, lakes, etc.).  On the other hand, we take it as given that environmental regulations and 
standards for the pollutants with serious public health hazard to be more or less the same across 
the counties.  While this is a reasonable assumption as far as the mandatory Federal and state 
minimum quality standards are concerned, it may not be true for less serious pollutants whose 
standards may be set by local public agencies, and consequently may vary across the counties.  
While one might suspect that regulations will be the main determinant of water quality and that 
water quality will be relatively homogeneous within California, the wide range of water quality 
levels observed suggests that this is not the case.  Consequently, both the demand and supply 
side factors must be considered. 
In this section, we present three sets of empirical models to test, using a reduced form of 
the supply and demand system.   
 
3.1.  The Relationship between Income and Water Quality 
To test whether the environmental Kuznets curve, usually tested at the country level, 
holds at the county-level in California, we estimate the following set of models:   
(1.a) 
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Here,  ,, its y  is the median of all samples taken of the pollutant of interest in county i in year t for 
site type s.  The site type refers to the type of body of water from which the samples underlying 
the water quality statistic were taken.  For example, yi,t,s might be the median level of nitrates in 
Fresno County lakes in 2001.   , it income  is per capita income in county i in year t.   , it S  is a vector 
of water body type dummy variables to control for the variation in pollution that naturally occurs 
between lakes, rivers, springs, and other water bodies.   
We assume that the error term has two components: an unobservable component at the 
county level,  i u , that is constant across time and a random shock,  , it  , that is normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of    .  For now, we assume that neither 
error term is spatially correlated.  We will relax this assumption in the third set of models.  We 
run both fixed effects and random effects models and then test whether  i u is correlated with the 
independent variables using the Hausman test.  All tables will show coefficient estimates from 
the models preferred by the Hausman test.  The traditional EKC hypothesis predicts a quadratic 
relationship with  1 0   and  2 0   , i.e. an inverted-U shape relationship.  This implies that 
environmental quality deteriorates as income increases for lower levels of per capita income, but 
then improves as income increases for higher levels of income.  To strengthen the test of the 
EKC hypothesis, we allow for a more flexible relationship by adding a cubic income term, thus 
expecting a priori that either  3 0    or, otherwise, that the second turning point occurs at income 
per head levels outside of our sample data range. 
It is possible that both water quality and income follow a similar time trend.  To separate 
the effects of a similar time trend and actual correlation, a time trend is included in model 1.b to 
capture the net effects of all the factors which may independently of income influence water 











standards, improvements over time in pollution abatement, monitoring, and enforcement 
technologies, and/or erosion over time of natural deposits and soil. Since the time trend might 
not be linear, we also add a quadratic time trend in 1.c. 
 
3.2.  The Effects of Socioeconomic Variables on Water Quality 
The second set of models again uses the median level of the pollutant as the dependent 
variable and functions of income and a time trend in the independent variables, but these models 
also include a vector,  , it X , that includes the socioeconomic-demographic variables described in 
the data section above.  We hypothesize that the inclusion of additional socioeconomic-
dempgraphic variables will eliminate many relationships found between income and water 
quality in the first set of models. 
A measure of sampling intensity is included in , it X .  Ideally, we would condition our 
analysis on the fact that a sample was taken using the Heckman two-step estimation procedure 
because areas sampled might be different than those areas that were not sampled.  However, no 
data are available on variables that predict whether or not a county samples its water but do not 
also explain water quality.  Instead of the two-step estimation, for each county, we generated a 
measure of the number of samples taken in a given year for a given pollutant and divided this 
number by the acres of water in that county.  We then created dummy variables for each quartile 
of sampling intensity.  We employed this dummy variable method because the relationship 
between sampling intensity and water quality is likely not constant for the entire range of 
sampling intensities.  We expect little difference in the lower half of sampling intensities with 
more significant differences in the higher ranges of intensity.  These dummy variables will 
control for differences between counties that sample frequently and those that sample 
infrequently.  Our results, however, cannot be generalized to counties that do not sample since 
we have not accounted for inherent differences in these types of counties.    











independent variables, (2.a) below includes quadratic specifications for many of the independent 
variables, and (2.b) uses the log-log specification.   
 (2.a) 
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Again, we assume a time-invariant unobservable component exists at the county level that is 
independent across counties, and we assume that a random shock exists at the county and year 
level.  To test whether the county level unobservable is correlated with the independent 
variables, we again run both fixed effects and random effects models and use the Hausman test 
to determine which model is appropriate. 
 
3.3.  Spatial Correlation 
Since watersheds usually do not coincide with county boundaries and since many water 
bodies span more than one county, spatial correlation likely exists in this dataset.  Ideally, this 
issue would be addressed with spatial autocorrelation or moving average specifications.   
Unfortunately, this dataset has many holes across both time and space, so few observations exist 
for which water quality data for all of the neighboring counties also exist.  Consequently, these 
types of estimations are impossible.  We do, however, have agricultural production data for all 
counties and years.  Using this data, we construct estimates of the intensity of agricultural 
activity in counties surrounding county i.  Crop-i,t-k is the total value of crop production in all 
counties bordering county i divided by the total acreage of land in these counties for the year t-k.  
Animal-i,t-k is identical to Crop-i,t-k except that is contains the value of animal production.  Three 
years worth of lagged values (k = 1, 2, or 3) and quadratic forms are included, as shown below.  
Since neighboring counties likely produce similar crops and animals, we did not include the 
current average value of crop and animal production in bordering counties.  Neighboring 
counties will experience the same production shocks such as extreme weather or increased pest 











Lagged production values will provide an indicator of production that will not suffer from these 
correlations.  Additionally, estimates of the mean residence time of water in stream systems and 
water basins smaller in size than any of the counties included in this analysis range from four 
months to 2.1 years (McGlynn et al. 2003; Sayama and McDonnell, 2009; Vitvar et al., 2002), 
suggesting that water movement across counties, aside from movement in river, will have a 
lagged impact on water quality.  In (3.a) and (3.b), the subscripts have the same interpretation as 
before except that now -i includes all of the counties bordering i. 
(3.a) 
23 2
, ,, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 2 , , , '' ' ' it its it it it x it c a t t s it i it it y income income income X Crop Animal t t S u                    
(3.b) 
2
,, 0 1 , , , , 2 , , ln( ) ln( ) 'ln( ) 'ln( ) 'ln( ) ' its it x it c it a it t t s it i it y income X Crop Animal t t S u                
where   ,, 1 , 2 , 3    ' it it it it Crop Crop Crop Crop        ,  , it Crop contains all of the terms in  , it Crop  as 
well as those terms squared,    ,, 1 , 2 , 3  ' it it it it Animal Animal Animal Animal        , and  , it Animal  
contains all of the terms in  , it Animal  as well as those terms squared.  Since this third set of 
models only controls for the movement of agricultural pollutants across counties, we only 
estimate these models for pollutants for which an agricultural source exists. 
  One might argue that rivers will drive the spatial correlation between counties.  Testing 
this hypothesis would provide interesting results about upstream-downstream relationships, but 
the lack of consistent sampling across time and space does not let us construct the spatial 
weighting matrix that such an analysis would require.  Additionally, since our socioeconomic 
variables are at the county level, we are compelled to consider water quality at that level of 
aggregation too, which in turn does not lead to strict upstream-downstream relationships.   
Instead, a watershed concept is more appropriate, and the models we use try to approximate this 
kind of relationship. 
 











In this section we present and discuss the selected estimation results of the three sets of 
empirical models. 
 
4.1.  The Relationship between Income and Water Quality 
The first phase of the analysis asks whether or not the traditional environmental Kuznets 
curve specification holds for water quality in California using models 1.a-1.c, which exclude the 
sociodempgraphic variables.  Table 4 contains the estimated coefficient values on the income 
and time variables for those pollutants for which an EKC relationship exists for at least one of 
the EKC models, using the correct random versus fixed effects specification.   
For variables such as arsenic, total coliform, and zinc, the relationship between income 
and the median pollutant level is not robust to the addition of the time trend, suggesting that both 
income and median concentrations of these pollutants have similar time trends.  For other 
variables, such as fecal coliform, nitrate, and pH, the relationship does not exist unless the time 
trends are included.  This suggests that models that exclude time trends suffer from omitted 
variables bias.  For ammonia, nickel, phosphorus, and specific conductivity, no time trend exists, 
so the EKC relationship is robust across all three specifications. 
Some previous analyses of the EKC have failed to control for other factors, such as 
education or ethnic composition, which may affect water quality (Galeotti et al., 2006; Gergel et 
al., 2004; Jia et al. 2006).  Our estimates of models 2.a and 2.b suggest that failing to control for 
these factors can result in falsely accepting the EKC hypothesis.  As shown in Table 5, with the 
addition of covariates, relationships only exist between income and the median pollutant level for 
copper, fecal coliform, and ammonia. Furthermore, these three relationships were only found 
using model 2.a.  No relationships exist between water quality and income using model 2.b.  And 
ammonia is the only pollutant for which the type of relationship does not change from the 
relationship found in models 1.a and1.c. Figures 1 and 2 graphically show the relationship 
between income and ammonia and fecal coliform with a small subset of samples plotted.  Fecal 











looking at plots for San Luis Obispo (SLO), and San Francisco counties.  The lack of robustness 
found for the EKC models suggests that such a relationship is rarely present at the county level 
in California. 
 
Table 5: Income Coefficient Estimates of Random Effects Regressions of Model 2.a.   
(Statistically Insignificant Models Not Shown) 
Pollutant    (2.a)  Shape for Income Range 
income  -5.25e-5**  Decreasing until $36,674 
income2 1.13e-9**  Increasing  until  $63,370 
income3 -7.53e-15** Decreasing thereafter (reaches 0 at 
$76,966 
Ammonia 
RE / FE  RE   
income  29.42*  Linear Increase 
income2  -5.10E-03   
income3  2.79E-09   
Copper 
RE vs. FE RE   
income  -0.49**  Decreasing until $38,298 
income2 1.06e-5**  Increasing  until  $59,794 
income3 -7.25e-11** Decreasing thereafter (reaches 0 at 
$65,973 
Fecal Coliform 
RE / FE  RE   
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
FE and RE indicate the fixed effect or random effect specification, respectively. 
 
Figure 1.  The Relationship between Ammonia and Per Capita Income with Some 






































































Figure 2.  The Relationship between Fecal Coliform and Per Capita Income with Some 
Randomly Selected River Medians Plotted. (n = 58) 

















































4.2.  Effects of Socioeconomic Variables on Water Quality 
The inclusion of other socioeconomic variables indicates that income is not the only 
determinant of water quality in California.  Education, ethnic composition, age structure, land 











water quality (Tables 6 and 7).   
 
Monitoring Intensity 
As discussed earlier, our dataset suffers from sample selection bias.  Within our dataset, 
some counties have more samples contributing to the median level of the pollutant.  There are 
two main reasons why sampling intensity may vary.  First, some counties may sample more 
because they are more concerned about water quality than those counties who sample less.  We 
would expect to see lower pollutant levels for counties sampling for this reason.  We should find 
negative coefficients on the monitoring intensity dummy variables because these variables 
measure the effect of monitoring intensity relative to the first quartile of monitoring intensity.  
Second, counties may sample more because they have poor water quality that needs to be closely 
monitored.  We would expect to see higher pollutant levels for counties sampling for this reason, 
and we should see positive coefficients on the monitoring intensity dummy variables. 
Our results find evidence of the former phenomenon in the model for ammonia.  We find 
evidence of the latter phenomenon occurring for about half of the pollutants examined.  Table 5 
and 6 show the coefficients for models 2.a and 2.b.  Interestingly, the highest intensity of 
sampling is not correlated with the worst water quality for magnesium, phosphorus, total 
suspended solids, specific conductivity, and sulfate.  For these pollutants, it appears that there are 
sites being sampled quite frequently and yet these sites have average or above average water 
quality, suggesting, in want of a better explanation, a possibility of inefficient use of resources. 
 
The Effects of Education 
Our model predicts a quadratic relationship between education and median levels of 
cadmium, copper, and fecal coliform.  Levels of cadmium decrease as education increases until 
63.5% of graduating high school seniors are eligible for UC and CSU schools (Figure 3).  The 
maximum percent eligible in the sample is 65.3%.  While our model suggests a quadratic 











levels of educational attainment might not actually occur.  For low levels of educational 
attainment, copper declines as education increases.  At 45.82%, levels of copper begin to 
increase again.  Only about 8% of the observations include eligibility rates above 45.82%, so like 
cadmium, the relationship at high levels of education may be imprecisely estimated. 
 
 
Figure 3.  The Relationship between Median Concentrations of Cadmium and Education 
Using Model 2.a. 





















































Fecal coliform exhibits the opposite relationship.  Levels of fecal coliform increase as 
education increases until eligibility rates of 45.17%, at which point, coliform levels decrease as 
education increases.  The same caveat that applied to copper and cadmium applies to fecal 
coliform; the downward turn at high levels of education may not be observed in reality.  The log-
log specification best fit the data for arsenic, and this model predicts that a 1% increase in UC-
CSU eligibility rates corresponds to a 2.73% decrease in median arsenic concentrations. 
It appears that for arsenic, cadmium, and copper, increasing education increases the 
demand for water quality, while for fecal coliform, increasing education does not increase the 
demand for lower coliform levels.  These discrepancies could be in part due to common 
knowledge about the effects, and presence, of bacteria while the effects and presence of 
pollutants like arsenic, cadmium, and copper may be less widely known.  Consequently, 











increase awareness and understanding of arsenic, cadmium, and copper. 
 
The Effects of Agriculture 
Interestingly, a $1 increase in the value of crop production per acre of county land is 
associated with a 0.02 ug/l decrease in cadmium concentrations.  The mean crop production 
value is $194.  A 10% increase at the median value, $19.40, would lead to about a 0.4  g/l 
decrease in cadmium, which is about 21% of the current median cadmium concentration.   
Cadmium comes from industrial sources, so it is likely that the negative and economically 
significant correlation between crop production and cadmium occurs because areas with a 
predominance of agricultural production have less industrial production.  Nickel is also 
negatively correlated with the value of crop production per acre of county land, but, unlike 
cadmium, it is a common agricultural pollutant.  Nickel can be found in fertilizer runoff, so one 
would expect no correlation or a positive correlation.  It is possible that lower valued crops tend 
to use more nickel-containing fertilizer, in which case, our measure of crop production intensity 
is inadequate to estimate the effects of crop production on nickel concentrations. 
As the value of animal production per acre of county land increases, the concentration of 
total suspended solids increases but at a decreasing rate (Figure 4).  The model implies a turning 
point at $494.34 per acre of county land.  This amount is within the range of values in the 
dataset, but only less than 1% of samples exceed this value.  It is likely that total suspended 
solids concentrations will level off instead of turning down at this turning point.  The increase in 
TSS is likely due to the erosion caused by animal grazing and animal movement.  Since there are 
spatial limits to the number of animals that can be produced in a given area, there are likely 
limits to the effects of animal production on total suspended solids.   
 
Figure 4.  The Relationship between Median Concentrations of Total Suspended Solids and 







































































The Effects of Ethnic Composition 
Our results show that the common belief that minorities are more often subject to lower 
environmental quality than Caucasians may not always hold true.  Higher percentages of 
Hispanic people are associated with higher levels of total suspended solids and nickel, but lower 
levels of manganese.  The correlation between the Hispanic population and nickel suggests that 
nickel is associated with fertilizer runoff used on lower valued farms.  Hispanic people are 
disproportionately employed at higher rates in agriculture in California, so areas with a higher 
percentage of Hispanic people are likely to have more agricultural activity as well. 
Higher percentages of African American people are associated with increased levels of 
arsenic and magnesium, but lower levels of copper and cadmium.  Similarly, Native Americans 
are associated with higher levels of phosphorus, sulfate, and magnesium, but lower levels of 
copper, and cadmium. 
Part of the discrepancy between the relationship between minorities and water quality 
found in this study and the relationship found in other studies is likely due to the difference in the 
spatial scale of observations.  Studies like Pearce et al. (2006) and Saha and Mohai (2005) find 
evidence of poorer environmental quality in areas with higher concentrations of minorities but 











respectively.  At the much larger county level, there does not appear to be a general trend 
between minority populations and water quality that holds across all pollutants.  However, at a 
more localized level, these trends may exist in California, and our coarse scale cannot detect 
them.   
  To determine if the effect of income on water quality varies by ethnic group, we run a set 
of regressions that interact race and income.  Interestingly, in the models for nitrates, total 
suspended solids, and selenium, the coefficient on the percent of a county’s population that is 
black is positive and statistically significant and the coefficient on the interaction between that 
variable and income is statistically significantly negative.  These relationships suggest that black 
people are more likely to experience lower water quality but as their income increases water 
quality improves.   
 
The Effects of Age Composition 
Although one might suspect populations containing individuals who are more susceptible 
to pollution, such as the very young or the elderly, to demand better water quality, our results 
only support this hypothesis for copper and arsenic.  For manganese and total suspended solids, 
higher percentages of children 4 years old and younger are associated with increased levels of 
these pollutants.  Possible explanations could be the greater toxicity of copper and arsenic 
particularly for very young children and/or the public’s awareness of, and sensitivity to, the 
consequences of these pollutants.   
 
The Effects of Gender 
Contrary to popular opinion that women tend to be more environmentally-minded, our 
results show that a one percentage point increase in the males’ share of the population is 
correlated with a 15.66% increase  in dissolved oxygen and a 17.25% decrease in arsenic 
concentrations.  Only for magnesium do we find a positive correlation between the males’ share 















This set of models finds time trends for two water quality indicators.  In model 2.a, 
chromium exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with time, with the turning point well 
before the start of our dataset.  Consequently, it appears that concentrations of chromium are 
decreasing, at an increasing rate over time.   In model 2.b, pH is positively correlated with time.  
This suggests that surface water in California is getting less acidic over time.  Models 2.a and 2.b 




4.3.  Spatial Correlation 
Our analysis of spatial correlation suggests that such correlation is, indeed, present 
(Tables 9 and 10).  We find statistically significant coefficients on the lagged variables as well as 
a change in significance of other related variables.  First, when the spillover variables are 
included, the relationship between income and median levels of ammonia and copper are no 
longer statistically significant.  Since median income is likely correlated across neighboring 
counties, income may actually be picking up the effect of other neighboring counties’ pollution. 
We find a positive relationship between phosphorus and the two year lagged value of 
neighboring counties’ crops; a one percent increase in the value of neighboring counties’ crop 
production per acre of neighboring county land is associated with an 8.81% increase in 
phosphorus concentration. A one percent increase in the two year lagged intensity of neighboring 
animal production is associated with a 14.07% increase in phosphorus concentration.  For both 
neighboring crop and animal production, agricultural production occurring further back in time 
has a negative impact on phosphorus concentration, but these impacts are smaller in magnitude 
than the above-mentioned impacts.  These negative relationships are likely picking up ecological 
phenomena such as algal cycles in response to phosphorus additions.   
                                                 
2 Our gender variable captures the number of males living in a given county, while the effect we believe we are 
picking up comes from the number of males working in a given county.  In 2004, the median commute time in 
California was 20 minutes (Barbour, 2006).  From this commute time, we infer that the majority of workers live and 
work within the same county. 











Once accounting for neighboring counties’ agricultural production, the coefficient on the 
county’s value of animal production becomes statistically significantly positive, predicting a 
2.14% increase in phosphorus concentrations for a 1% increase in the value of animal production 
per acre of county land.  When accounting for spatial correlation, the coefficient on the value of 
crop production becomes negative.  Phosphorus can come from both fertilizer and manure 
runoff, but based on these results, animal production seems to be a greater contributor to 
phosphorus in California surface water than crop production.  This could be due to better 
methods of preventing fertilizer runoff as compared to methods of preventing animal waste 
runoff. 
The relationship between total suspended solids and neighboring crop production is less 
clear.  The value of crop production lagged one year is positively correlated with total suspended 
solids, but the value of crop production lagged three years is negatively correlated.  This latter 
phenomenon could in part be due to delayed clean-up efforts that bring water bodies with high 
total suspended solids down to much lower levels, but only after levels have been elevated for a 
few years.  When the spillover variables are included, the positive relationship seen between total 
suspended solids and animal production is no longer statistically significant and the value of crop 
production becomes positively related to total suspended solids.  Based on these results, it seems 
that crop production has an immediate and more localized effect on levels of total suspended 
solids than it does on phosphorus.  Interestingly, with the inclusion of spatial controls, a u-shaped 
relationship between time and total suspended solids emerges, with the turning point occurring in 
2003.  This suggests that total suspended solid concentrations are currently increasing over time, 
and this trend could be due, partly, to increased construction and development across the state of 
California. 
Specific conductivity is becoming an increasingly important problem in agricultural areas 
of California.  When we do not control for spatial correlation, there is no relationship between 
specific conductivity and either measure of agricultural production.  However, once we control 











production and specific conductivity appears, with the turning point occurring at $772.94 (Figure 
5).  Only 6% of observations lie above this value, and like models discussed previously, it is 
possible that this turning point is better described as a leveling off point.  Specific conductivity 
can impede the production of crops, so highly valued crops cannot always be grown in areas with 
high specific conductivity.  While agriculture is a main contributor to specific conductivity in 
many parts of the state, our indicator of agricultural production picks up the effects of specific 
conductivity on crop choice and production possibilities instead of the effect of crop production 
on specific conductivity.   
 
Figure 5. The Relationship between Specific Conductivity and the Value of Crop 
Production per Acre of County Land 







































An interesting relationship exists between pH and bordering counties’ value of animal 
production.  Animal waste contains ammonia, and this ammonia can bubble up into the air and 
contribute to acid rain (Reddi, 2003).  When controlling for spillover effects, the coefficient on 
the value of neighboring counties’ animal production lagged one year implies that a one percent 
increase in neighboring counties’ animal production decreases pH by 0.5%, implying more 











own-county animal production is insignificant.  Given the mechanism through which animal 
production contributes to water pH, it appears that animal production has a greater impact on 
surrounding areas than the immediate area of production.  Additionally, the time trend found in 
model 2.b for pH is robust to the addition of the spatial controls.  
The inclusion of spatial controls leads to time trends in the models for nitrate and nickel.  
The relationship between nitrate and time is very similar to the relationship discussed for 
chromium above; nitrate concentrations are decreasing over time at an increasing rate.  Model 
3.b estimates that nickel concentrations are also decreasing over time.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
This study has found that contrary to what one might expect, the per capita income is not  
a significant factor in explaining the variability in water quality indicators across the counties in 
California. Rather, many factors both on the supply side (for example, agricultural and industrial 
activities, and spatial characteristics where these activities take place) and the demand side (for 
example, socioeconomic-demographic factors influencing preferences and the demand for 
environmental quality) affect concentrations of water pollutants in California.  Our econometric  
estimations show that while for some specifications, the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis 
is supported, these finding are not robust to the inclusion of socioeconomic variables or controls 
for spatial correlation.  The study area is likely driving this result.  Previous work that finds 
significant relationships between income and environmental quality (Grossman and Krueger, 
1995; Cole, 2004; Khanna and Plausman, 2004) often uses observations from a wide range of 
income levels and finds turning points that occur at income levels below the minimum level of 
income contained in our dataset.  Our data may support their findings but the California per 
capita income levels in our dataset are at levels that exceed the income ranges of their studies.  
Additionally, if pollution tends to level off at high ends of income, this may explain why we find 
very few statistically significant relationships between income and water quality; all of our 











shaped relationship between income and environmental quality.  It is possible that our data are 
concentrated around the second turning point, and consequently, the relationship appears to be 
flat. 
Our estimation of the relationships between education and water quality suggest that a 
continued emphasis on education in California may create a population that is more aware of, 
and concerned about, water quality.  The estimated relationships between measures of 
agricultural activity and water pollution levels suggest the importance of understanding which 
sectors of agriculture (livestock production or crop production) has a stronger impact on water 
quality and in what specific ways. The evidence of spillover effects of phosphorus and pH 
suggest that policies designed to control these types of pollutants must consider a broader spatial 
scale than those pollutants for which the source and impact occur in the same area.  The lack of a 
statistical relationship between agricultural activity and many pollutants commonly associated 
with agriculture suggests that other sources contribute to these pollutants, and policies designed 
to control these pollutants should consider all sources in order to be effective. The statistically 
significant time trends found in this study suggest that for chromium, nitrates, and nickel, 
programs and policies designed to reduce concentrations have been successful.  However, while 
the concentration of total suspended solids was decreasing up until 2003, it is now increasing 
over time, holding all other variables constant.  This time trend suggests that policies put in place 
to control TSS may be inadequate. 
Similarly, the relationships we found between monitoring intensity and median 
concentrations suggest that for some pollutants such as arsenic, fecal coliform, magnesium, and 
nitrate, sampling is efficiently targeted at sites with poor water quality.  On the other hand, for 
pollutants such as phosphorus and total suspended solids, water bodies with low pollutant 
concentrations are sampled too frequently. 
Future work can improve the estimations presented in this paper by including a 
randomized, balanced panel dataset of water quality in California to ensure that results are 











many of the turning points occur at the ends of variable ranges, repeating the estimation 
procedures as ranges shift can shed light on whether or not turning points actually occur. Finally, 
while this study has focused mainly on socioeconomic factors, future research need to explicitly 
and in more detail incorporate natural processes and factors such as cite characteristics, 
variability in soil properties and climate patterns, hydrological connectivity and pollutant 
transport and discharge, and rural (agricultural runoff) versus urban (construction and industrial) 
sources of water pollution in California.  
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Table 1: Sources of Water Pollution 
Pollutant  Natural Sources  Industrial Sources  Agricultural Sources  Household Sources 
Ammonia  
coke plant emissions and 
effluent, ceramic 
production, mining 
fertilizer runoff, animal 
waste runoff 
septic systems, cleaning 
products, sewage treatment 
plants 
Arsenic
1  erosion of natural deposits  glass and electronics 
production runoff  orchard runoff   
Cadmium  erosion of natural deposits  Galvanized pipe corrosion, 
metal refinery discharge   
galvanized pipe corrosion, 
waste batteries and paint 
runoff 
Chromium  erosion of natural deposits  steel and pulp mill discharge     




warm weather, runoff from 
forests  thermal pollution  runoff from pastures, 
cropland  waste water treatment plants 
Fecal 
Coliform  animal waste    animal waste  human and animal waste 
Iron
2  naturally occurring    Fertilizer and insecticide 
runoff  corroding pipes 
Lead  erosion of natural deposits      plumbing system corrosion 
Magnesium  erosion of natural deposits  construction and electronic 
industry runoff  fertilizer runoff   
Manganese
3  naturally occurring  industrial discharge    landfill runoff 
Mercury
4  erosion of natural deposits  refinery and factory 
discharge  cropland runoff  landfill runoff 
Nickel
5  erosion of natural deposits  power plant and metal 
industry emissions  fertilizer runoff  waste incinerator emissions 
Nitrate
6  erosion of natural deposits   fertilizer  runoff  fertilizer runoff, septic tank 
leaching, sewage 
Nitrite
7  erosion of natural deposits   fertilizer  runoff  fertilizer runoff, septic tank 
leaching, sewage 
pH
H  erosion of bicarbonates and 
carbonates  industrial pollutant dumping     
pH
L rain  coal burning industry 
emissions, mining  manure storage  automobile emissions 
Phosphorus  erosion of natural deposits  industrial effluent  fertilizer and manure runoff  sewage effluent 
Selenium  erosion of natural deposits  petroleum refinery 
discharge, mine discharge    
Specific 
Conductivity  erosion of natural deposits  Industrial inputs  agricultural runoff  road salt 
Sulfate  erosion of gypsum, 
volcanoes 
mining runoff, fossil fuel 
combustion  fertilizer runoff   
Total 
Coliform 
naturally present, animal 














natural soil erosion  industrial wastewater  Soil erosion 
soil erosion from 
construction sites, sanitary 
wastewater 
Zinc  erosion of natural deposits  alloys, paints, batteries, car 
parts, electrical wiring  insecticide runoff  sewage sludge 
a: Sources refer to sources that reduce the dissolved oxygen content 
L: sources refer to causes of low pH, H: sources refer to causes of high pH 
Source unless otherwise noted:  EPA.  2008.  Drinking Water Contaminants.  Available: 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/contaminants/index.html 
1: Texas Cooperative Extension.  2008.  Dissolved Oxygen.  Available: 
http://aquaplant.tamu.edu/contents/dissolved_oxygen.htm. 
2: Illinois Department of Public Health.  1999.  Iron in Drinking Water.  Available: 
http://www.idph.state.il.us/envhealth/factsheets/ironFS.htm  
3: EPA.  2004.  Drinking Health Advisory for Manganese.  Available: 
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/ccl/pdfs/reg_determine1/support_cc1_magnese_dwreport.pdf 
4: Water on the Web.  2008.  Glossary.  Available: http://waterontheweb.org/resources/glossary.html. 
5: USGS.  2006.  The Effect of Urbanization on Water Quality: Phosphorus.  Available: 
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/urbanpho.html. 
6: Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.  Total Suspended Solids.  Available: 
http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-swq-npdes-TotalSuspendedSolids.pdf. 
7: Central New York’s New Real-Time Surface Water Quality Network.  2008.  Specific Conductivity.  Available: 
http://www.ourlake.org/html/specific_conductivity.html. 
 
Table 4: Random or Fixed Effects Regression Results for Models 1.a-c. (Statistically 
Insignificant Models Not Shown) 
Pollutant   (1.a)  (1.b)  (1.c)    Pollutant   (1.a)  (1.b)  (1.c) 
income -1.28e-4**  -1.18e-4*  -1.12e-4*   income 5.13E-04  -7.95e-4*  -8.20e-4* 
income
2 2.41e-9**  2.27e-9** 2.23e-9*   income
2 1.09E-08 1.52e-8* 1.58e-8* 
income
3 -1.45e-14**  -1.38e-14**  -1.35e-14**    income
3 -7.02E-14  -9.29e-14* -9.63e-14* 
time   -2.41E-03  0.51    time  0.05  -10.98 
time
2     -1.28E-04    time
2     2.76E-03 
Ammonia 
RE/FE FE  FE  FE   
pH 
RE/FE FE  FE  FE 
income  -0.02*  -0.01  -9.28E-03    income  -4.68e-4** -5.79e-4** -5.30e-4* 
income
2  3.00E-07  1.89E-07  1.51E-07    income
2  8.56e-9**  1.02e-8**  9.46e-9** 
income
3  -1.74E-07  -1.06E-12  -8.23E-13    income
3  -5.00e-14** -5.90e-14** -5.48e-14* 
time    4.21  2.05E+02    time    0.02  10.09 
time
2      -5.00E-02    time
2      -2.52E-03 
Arsenic 
RE/FE  FE  FE  FE   
Phosphorus 
RE/FE  FE  FE  FE 
income 86.14** 88.61* 127.72**    income -4.25**  -3.33  -3.23 
income
2 -1.51e-3*  -1.55E-03  -2.33e-3**    income
2 1.04** 8.94e-5*  8.78e-5* 
income
3 8.55E-09  8.78E-09  1.36e-8**    income
3 -6.77e-10** -6.10e-10* -6.01e-10* 
time   -276.77  5427649***    time   -180.43  57979.15 
time
2     -1358.44***   time
2    -14.55 
Copper 
RE/FE FE  FE  FE   
Specific Conductivity











income  0.04  0.57***  0.57***    income  0.42  0.37  0.37 
income
2  -8.35E-07  -1.29e-5***  -1.28e-5***    income
2  -9.96E-06  -8.61E-06  -8.64E-06 
income
3  6.24E-12  9.36e-11***  9.35e-11***    income
3  7.52e-11*  6.29E-11  6.31E-11 
time    -56.27***  48.46***    time    54.91*  -57.83* 
time
2      -0.03***    time
2      0.03* 
Fecal Coliform 
RE/FE  RE  RE  RE   
Total Coliform 
RE/FE  RE  RE  RE 
income -1.77e-3*  -1.87e-3*  -1.87e-3*    income 566.18* 2202.06 218.57 
income
2 3.93e-8* 4.16e-8* 3.16e-8*    income
2 -0.01*  -0.06 -5.83E-03 
income
3 -2.63e-13*  -2.79e-13*  -2.79e-13*    income
3 1.26e-7*  5.16E-07  5.02E-08 
time  0.05  -0.03    time   17419.7*  -20060.34**
time
2     2.01E-05    time
2     9.37** 
Nickel 
RE/FE RE  RE  RE   
Zinc 
RE/FE RE  RE  RE 
income  1.18E-03  2.32e-3*  3.08e-3**          
income
2  -2.07E-08  -3.68E-08  -4.96e-8**          
income
3  1.16E-13  1.98E-13  2.68e-13*          
time    -0.32*  240.48***          
time
2      -0.06***          
Nitrate 
RE/FE  FE  FE  FE          
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.  FE and RE 
indicate the fixed effect or random effect specification, respectively. 
  
Table 6: Regression Results for Model 2.a. (Site Type Effects Excluded from Table) 
 Variable  Ammonia  Cadmium  Chromium 
Income -5.23E-5**  2.35E-03  1.27E-03 
Income Squared  1.13E-9**  -4.59E-08  -2.10E-08  Income 
Income Cubed  -7.53E-15**  2.66E-13  1.03E-13 
Time  -0.01  0.53  1.22* 
Time 
Time Squared  3.23E-06  -2.66E-04  -6.23E-4* 
Water Acres  2.00E-07  4.34E-05  4.92E-06 
Water Acres 
Water  Acres  Squared  -3.41E-13 -7.76E-11 -1.51E-11 
Moderate Low Monitoring  -0.04*  1.92  -0.10 
Moderate High Monitoring  -0.02  1.44  -0.23  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  -0.01  -2.55  -1.77 
Population  Density  0.01 -0.49 0.47 
Population Density 
Population Density Squared  -1.29E-04  0.01  -0.04 
Education  -0.01  -1.27***  0.39 
Education 
Education Squared  1.21E-04  0.01***  -0.01 
Value of Crop  -5.54E-05  -0.02*  -0.02 
Value of Crop Squared  6.37E-08  9.62E-06  1.86E-05 
Value of Animal  1.24E-04  -0.02  0.08 
Intensity of Agricultural Production 











Immigrants  Percent Immigrants  0.45  110.37  248.97 
Percent Black  0.17  -96.99***  -18.90 
Percent Asian or PI  -0.32  47.50*  13.09 
Percent Native American  -1.24  -189.69***  45.69 
Percent Hispanic  -0.33  -7.81  14.43 
Ethnic Composition 
Percent Other  0.32  126.21  169.34 
Gender  Percent Males  0.36  7.63  44.64 
Percent 0 to 4  1.37  -10.63  -45.22 
Percent 5 to 17  0.44  88.44  -13.17 
Percent 18 to 40  0.29  -51.86*  5.62 
Age Composition 
Percent 65 or Older  0.08  30.78  52.11 
  Constant       
  Observations  94  80  67 
  Groups  29  25  25 
  R-Squared  0.5477  0.7668  0.9862 
  RE / FE  RE  RE  RE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 




Table 6: Regression Results for Model 2.a. (Site Type Effects Excluded from Table), 
Continued 
 Variable  Copper  Fecal Coliform  Nitrate 
Income 29.42*  -0.49**  0.000493 
Income Squared  -5.10E-04  1.06E-5**  -1E-08  Income 
Income Cubed  2.79E-09  -7.30E-11**  6.81E-14 
Time  6514.85  28.88  0.17 
Time 
Time Squared  -3.42  -0.01  -8.5E-05 
Water Acres  0.54  -1.67E-03  3.95E-06 
Water Acres 
Water Acres Squared  -9.04E-07  5.23E-9***  -8.1E-12 
Moderate Low Monitoring  9027.94  1032.15***  0.84 
Moderate High Monitoring  23354.31  880.94***  0.41  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  17873.12  871.68***  2.46*** 
Population Density  -3510.71  64.74  -0.10 
Population Density 
Population Density Squared  16.55  -2.27  0.01 
Education  -11120.83**  60.54**  0.08 
Education 
Education Squared  121.36**  -0.67**  -0.00072 
Value  of  Crop  -160.23 1.42* -0.0016 
Value of Crop Squared  0.06  -6.53E-04  6.26E-07 
Intensity of Agricultural Production 











Value of Animal Squared  2.80  -1.36E-03  0.000034 
Immigrants  Percent Immigrants  -2628089.00  9307.24  -302.69** 
Percent Black  -635174.8**  3728.12  13.49 
Percent Asian or PI  470949.70*  -1382.47  -2.85 
Percent Native American  -1835387.00***  5108.70  -0.34 
Percent Hispanic  16201.06  243.05  7.90 
Ethnic Composition 
Percent Other  1573866.00  21047.49*  20.11 
Gender  Percent Males  669737.10  9379.49  -13.62 
Percent 0 to 4  -3350633.00*  1085.13  1.02 
Percent 5 to 17  1769918.00***  -4021.42  -9.80 
Percent 18 to 40  -251732.50  -2896.95  9.70 
Age Composition 
Percent 65 or Older  16282.22  6897.26  -3.31 
  Constant       
  Observations  95  55  116 
  Groups  25  16  32 
  R-Squared  0.5875  0.9959  0.4477 
  RE / FE  RE  RE  RE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 




Table 6: Regression Results for Model 2.a. (Site Type Effects Excluded from Table), 
Continued 




Income 1.02E-04  1.12  1.67 
Income Squared  4.21E-09  -1.98E-05  -4.01E-05  Income 
Income Cubed  -5.77E-14  1.43E-10  3.13E-10 
Time  0.45  -364.40  -575448.40 
Time 
Time Squared  -2.27E-04  0.18  143.45 
Water Acres  1.43E-06  -0.01   
Water Acres 
Water Acres Squared  -5.92E-12  4.61E-09   
Moderate Low Monitoring  -1.41  2606.35  4038.30** 
Moderate High Monitoring  2.82  4766.49**  6362.90**  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  1.01  2868.93  3721.22 
Population Density  -0.42  -1295.34  231726.30*** 
Population Density 
Population Density Squared  0.02  46.05  -22100.29*** 
Education  -0.25  -191.67  752.17 
Education 
Education Squared  2.27E-03  2.20  -10.37 
Value of Crop  -0.01  -9.72  17.78  Intensity of Agricultural Production 











Value of Animal  -0.01  -13.00  336.15*** 
Value of Animal Squared  -7.13E-07  0.02  -0.34*** 
Immigrants  Percent Immigrants  -656.83  -364298.40  -15925.32 
Percent Black  -18.52  -14339.53  454307.70 
Percent Asian or PI  2.81  33070.79  -47516.99 
Percent Native American  -103.09  -33484.28  -547528.20 
Percent Hispanic  26.75  -3341.65  299331.10** 
Ethnic Composition 
Percent Other  411.25**  -243095.20**  -65230.89 
Gender  Percent Males  17.86  -187.61  40725.85 
Percent 0 to 4  159.78  13294.02  808379.10* 
Percent 5 to 17  -63.66  5522.83  -365171.30** 
Percent 18 to 40  -7.01  15193.82  39501.35 
Age Composition 
Percent 65 or Older  -9.90  6062.48  -11512.96 
  Constant      5.77E+08 
  Observations  125  442  145 
  Groups  42  52  45 
  R-Squared  0.3617  0.3030  0.0004 
  RE / FE  RE  RE  FE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
FE and RE indicate the fixed effect or random effect specification, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7: Regression Results for Model 2.b. (Site Type Effects Excluded from Table) 
   Arsenic  Dissolved  Oxygen Magnesium 
Income Ln(Income)  0.56  -5.21  12.47 
Time  Time  -0.10  -0.34  -0.22 
Water Acres  Ln(Water Acres)  0.37    -4.75* 
Moderately Low Monitoring  1.15*  -0.73**  2.75 
Moderately High Monitoring  1.42**  -0.77**  2.68  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  5.07***  -1.28***  3.63** 
Population Density  Ln(Population Density)  0.63*  9.22  4.81** 
Education  Ln(Education)  -2.73**  0.44  1.78 
Ln(Crop Value)  0.46  0.04  -2.12 
Intensity of Agricultural Production 
Ln(Animal  Value)  0.00 0.16 2.76 
Immigrants  Ln(Percent Immigrant)  -0.67  0.36  0.24 
Ln(Percent Black)  1.34*  -1.87  7.23*** 
Ln(Percent Asian or PI)  -2.11  -1.21  -8.85 
Ln(Percent Native American)  -1.62  0.93  9.74*** 
Ln(Percent Hispanic)  -1.57  1.75  -4.34 
Ethnic Composition 
Ln(Percent Other)  -1.11  -0.07  2.76** 











Ln(Percent 0 to 4)  -5.29  0.13  -7.69 
Ln(Percent 5 to 17)  3.61  -1.36  34.15 
Ln(Percent 18 to 40)  6.42  -13.43***  46.39* 
Age Composition 
Ln(Percent 65 or Older)  -2.25  -1.08  32.19 
  Constant  153.30  733.62  737.54 
  Observations  50  203  46 
  Groups  21  47  11 
  R-Squared  0.9239  0.0389  0.9948 
  RE/FE  RE  FE  RE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 





Table 7: Regression Results for Model 2.b. (Site Type Effects Excluded from Table), 
Continued 
   pH  Phosphorus  Sulfate 
Income Ln(Income)  0.14  -5.83  3.13 
Time  Time  0.11**  -0.58  0.56 
Water  Acres  Ln(Water  Acres)   0.81  
Moderately Low Monitoring  0.07  -1.46  1.17 
Moderately High Monitoring  -0.03  -2.57**  2.90**  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  0.27**  -1.74  2.28 
Population Density  Ln(Population Density)  -2.91  1.11  -15.69 
Education  Ln(Education)  0.07  5.31  1.83 
Ln(Crop Value)  0.07  -0.03  -1.23 
Intensity of Agricultural Production 
Ln(Animal Value)  -0.02  0.52  1.42 
Immigrants  Ln(Percent Immigrant)  0.02  1.97  1.17 
Ln(Percent Black)  1.15**  -1.46  -8.09 
Ln(Percent Asian or PI)  0.56  -2.16  -13.03 
Ln(Percent Native American)  -0.17  3.80**  8.94* 
Ln(Percent  Hispanic)  -1.19 2.80 -4.04 
Ethnic Composition 
Ln(Percent Other)  0.03  2.45*  -1.19 
Gender  Ln(Percent Males)  0.76  -39.39  155.82 
Ln(Percent 0 to 4)  1.08*  7.65  13.49 
Ln(Percent 5 to 17)  -0.61  -22.83***  -18.95 
Ln(Percent 18 to 40)  0.13  -39.42**  0.79 
Age Composition 
Ln(Percent 65 or Older)  -1.35**  -15.31**  -3.32 
  Constant  -214.55**  1098.67  -1117.47 











  Groups  49  17  28 
  R-Squared  0.0087  0.9201  0.0781 
  RE/FE  FE  RE  FE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 




Table 8: Regression Results for Model 2.b. with Ethnic Composition and Income 
Interaction Terms (Site Type Effects Excluded from Table) 
   Variable  Nitrates  Selenium  Specific 
Conductivity
Income 1.23E-04  -1.70E-03  1.51 
Income Squared  5.26E-10  5.96E-08  -3.98E-05  Income 
Income Cubed  -2.22E-14  -4.43E-13  3.42E-10 
Time  0.23**  0.53  -348.14 
Time 
Time Squared  -1.19E-04** -2.63E-04  0.17 
Water Acres  7.89E-06  1.21E-05  1.04E+03 
Water Acres 
Water Acres Squared  -1.24E-11  -1.30E-11  -3.71E-09 
Moderate Low Monitoring  0.93  -0.49  1796.49 
Moderate High Monitoring  0.99  4.05*  3613.57*  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  3.01***  -0.05  1733.79 
Population Density  0.31  -0.50  -2302.46 
Population Density 
Population Density Squared  -1.68E-03  4.76E-03  76.69* 
Education  0.10  -0.27  -266.83 
Education 
Education Squared  -3.40E-04  4.30E-03  2.77 
Value of Crop  -2.08E-03  2.98E-03  -5.18 
Value of Crop Squared  1.36E-06  -5.39E-06  3.11E-03 
Value of Animal  -0.02  -0.06*  -3.22 
Intensity of Agricultural Production 
Value of Animal Squared  6.24E-05  8.02E-05  0.01 
Immigrants  Percent Immigrants  -396.82  -3435.35  1755861.00 
Percent Black  113.15**  200.07  -186306.00**
Percent Asian or PI  -20.72  277.28  -56437.36 
Percent Native American  11.32  -445.74  -40229.79 
Percent Hispanic  12.48  119.49*  -41764.89 
Ethnic Composition 
Percent Other  -167.98  483.67  120181.40 
Percent Immigrants*Income  3.84E-03  0.07  -59.29 
Percent Black*Income  -2.57E-03** -0.01*  6.60*** 
Percent Asian or PI*Income  1.22E+04  -0.01  2.55 
Percent Native American*Income  -4.6E-05  0.01  0.10 
Percent Hispanic*Income  -2.33E-04  -3.28E-03  1.19 
Income Interaction 











Gender Percent  Males  -4.89  -9.77  82.81 
   Constant          
  Observations  116  125  442 
  Groups  32  42  52 
  R-Squared  0.4895  0.4177  0.3240 
   RE/FE  RE  RE  RE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 






Table 9: Regression Results for Model 3.a. (Site Type, Age and Composition, and Water 
Acres Effects Excluded from Table) 
   Variable  Ammonia  Chromium  Copper 
Income -2.46E-05  -1.03E-03  26.75 
Income Squared  4.88E-10  2.25E-08  -4.39E-04  Income 
Income Cubed  -2.84E-15  -1.70E-13  2.16E-09 
Time  -3.35E-03  0.26  6923.70 
Time 
Time Squared  161.00*  -1.26E-04  -3.61 
Crop_1 -71054.97***  2426.77  -7914567.00 
Crop_1 Squared  18.55  -3366271.00*  6.38E+09 
Crop_2 -1672.34  11348.34*  4.65E+07 
Crop_2 Squared  -291.90  -2900024.00***  -3.47E+09 
Crop_3 84450.58***  -22238.68*  -1.06E+08 
Crop_3 Squared  2011.26  1.23E+7**  4.39E+08 
Animal_1 -1898076.00  -254694.40*8  -3.31E+08 
Animal_1 Squared  1782.63  2.35E+8**  6.06E+11 
Animal_2 -2566277.00  14026.55  4.07E+08 
Animal_2 Squared  -3650.83  1.73E+08  -1.39E+12 
Animal_3 4534974.00  266603.70**  4.28E+08 
Spillover Effects 
Animal_3 Squared  3.14E-08  -4.53E+8**  2.75E+10 
Moderate Low Monitoring  -0.01  0.08  6278.37 
Moderate High Monitoring  -0.01  -0.99  18954.08  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  0.01  -2.01  14811.54 
Population Density  -4.39E-04  3.41**  -17655.90 
Population Density 
Population Density Squared  2.75E-04  -0.56**  1016.03 
Education  -2.70E-05  -0.36  -12823.49** 
Education 
Education Squared  2.35E-05  0.01  150.11 
Value of Crop  9.82E-09  -0.02  -174.83  Agricultural Intensity 











Value of Animal  -6.35E-07  0.05  -544.05 
Value of Animal Squared  -3.42  -2.17E-04  2.82 
  Constant       
  Observations  94  67  95 
  Groups  29  25  25 
  R-Squared  0.7059  0.9974  0.6005 
  RE/FE  RE  RE  RE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 








Table 9: Regression Results for Model 3.a. (Site Type, Age and Composition, and Water 
Acres Effects Excluded from Table), Continued 





Income -1.48  3.20E-04  1.70  4.87 
Income Squared  3.62E-05  -6.12E-09  -3.35E-05  0.00  Income 
Income Cubed  -2.88E-10  4.32E-14  2.40E-10  0.00 
Time  53.25  0.37*  -175.43  -1306277.00**
Time 
Time Squared  -0.03  -1.82e-4*  0.08  326.02** 
Crop_1 3332767.00  990.55  -2210413.00  -6.22E+7** 
Crop_1  Squared  -3.08E+08 53314.97 -8.39E+08  4.09E+10** 
Crop_2 1170947.00  781.18  -2556546.00  -2.68E+07 
Crop_2 Squared  -1.64E+08  924.91  2.82E+07  2.12E+10 
Crop_3 -5858282.00  -2917.65  1.04E+07  9.76E+7** 
Crop_3 Squared  8.43E+08  133818.40  -4.95E+08  -9.92E+10** 
Animal_1 -9737963.00  -36363.43  4.84E+07  6.18E+07 
Animal_1  Squared  7.91E+10 7.54E+07 -6.56E+10 1.32E+11 
Animal_2 -1.35E+07  -54835.84  -5386712.00  5.30E+8* 
Animal_2 Squared  3.44E+10  7.32E+07  -8.90E+09  -1.11E+12** 
Animal_3 3.48E+07  69785.83  -4.80E+07  -1.99E+08 
Spillover Effects 
Animal_3 Squared  -1.28E+11  -1.00E+08  6.46E+10  3.49E+11 
Moderate Low Monitoring 1112.81***  0.70  2147.68  1486.70 
Moderate High Monitoring 964.08***  0.32  3940.19**  2815.69 
Monitoring 
Intensity 
High Monitoring  687.60  2.25***  2456.05  3964.39 











Population Density Squared -9.96  -0.01  33.99  4592.51 
Education  3.29  0.17  23.33  -42.67 
Education 
Education Squared  0.20  -1.97E-03  -1.47  1.17 
Value of Crop  0.55  1.81E-03  -18.18**  90.54** 
Value of Crop Squared  -1.86E-04  -7.32E-07  0.01*  -0.0461126***
Value of Animal  8.85  -0.03  -2.61  -26.84 
Agricultural 
Intensity 
Value of Animal Squared  -0.03  8.96E-05  9.53E-03  -0.04 
  Constant        1.31E+9** 
  Observations  55  116  442  145 
  Groups  16  32  52  45 
  R-Squared  0.9981  0.5037  0.3239  0.0092 
  RE/FE  RE  RE  RE  FE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
FE and RE indicate the fixed effect or random effect specification, respectively. 
 
Table 10: Regression Results for Model 3.b. (Site Type, Age and Composition, and Water 
Acres Effects Excluded from Table) 
   Arsenic  Dissolved 
Oxygen  Magnesium
Income Ln(Income)  0.75  -4.03  -5.82 
Time  Time  0.03  -0.28  0.40 
Ln(Crop_1)  -0.90 0.17 -0.43 
Ln(Crop_2) -0.70  -0.59  11.97** 
Ln(Crop_3) 1.13  -0.16  0.40 
Ln(Animal_1)  -2.31 0.80 -1.65 
Ln(Animal_2) -3.20  1.36  -11.33*** 
Spillover Effects 
Ln(Animal_3) 5.99**  -2.28  4.04 
Moderately Low Monitoring 1.24*  -0.73**  2.68** 
Moderately High Monitoring 1.53**  -0.77**  2.19*  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  6.71***  -1.24**  4.00*** 
Population Density  Ln(Population Density)  0.01  10.72  4.94** 
Education  Ln(Education)  -3.33**  0.48  2.15 
Ln(Crop Value)  0.91  0.00  -2.83 
Intensity of Agricultural Production 
Ln(Animal  Value)  0.02 0.32 4.50 
Gender  Ln(Percent Males)  -16.19  14.72  311.38*** 
 Constant  -132.11  604.72  -84.40 
  Observations  50 203 46 
 Groups  21  47  11 
  R-Squared  0.9460 0.0346 0.9637 
  RE/FE  RE FE RE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 











Table 10: Regression Results for Model 3.b. (Site Type, Age and Composition, and Water 
Acres Effects Excluded from Table), Continued 
   Nickel  pH  Phosphorus  Sulfate 
Income Ln(Income)  0.17  -0.18  -9.29  2.05 
Time  Time  -0.50**  0.12**  0.60  1.64 
Ln(Crop_1) -0.16  0.05  0.37  -1.08 
Ln(Crop_2) -1.17  0.28  8.81***  1.58 
Ln(Crop_3) 0.88  0.20  -6.09***  -1.15 
Ln(Animal_1) 2.23  -0.64*  -2.07  0.40 
Ln(Animal_2) 0.42  0.01  14.07**  -1.93 
Spillover Effects 
Ln(Animal_3)  -2.11  -0.27 -13.75*** -0.07 
Moderately Low Monitoring  0.82**  0.04  1.59  0.95 
Moderately High Monitoring  1.18**  -0.02  0.42  2.63**  Monitoring Intensity 
High Monitoring  0.12  0.29***  -3.47**  1.76 
Population Density  Ln(Population Density)  -0.35  -3.14*  2.14  -37.66 
Education  Ln(Education)  1.63  0.16  14.64*  1.95 
Ln(Crop Value)  -0.50*  0.12  -1.74**  -2.03  Intensity of Agricultural 
Production  Ln(Animal Value)  0.31  0.03  2.14***  2.29 
Gender  Ln(Percent Males)  7.08  0.73  -101.79  264.78 
 Constant  992.09**  -244.10**  -1149.64  -3268.17 
 Observations  45  240  42  93 
  Groups  21 49 17 28 
  R-Squared  0.8785 0.0143 0.9697 0.0821 
  RE/FE  RE FE RE FE 
*, **, and *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
FE and RE indicate the fixed effect or random effect specification, respectively. 
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